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RETROACTIVE LAWS-ENVffiONMENTAL LAW-
Retroactive Application of the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 
On January I, 1970, Congress took a major step in the continuing 
struggle to control man's exploitation of his environment by enact-
ing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).1 This 
Act, hailed by some conservationists as one of the most important 
environmental developments of the decade,2 is designed primarily 
to prevent the misuse and abuse of the environment resulting either 
directly or indirectly from federal agency activity. In essence, by es-
tablishing a broad national policy giving a strong priority to the con-
sideration of ecological factors and by implementing procedures de-
signed to bring agency action into line with this policy, the Act may 
provide the basis from which actions may be brought to compel fed-
eral agencies to justify their decisions in terms of the effect that those 
decisions will have on the environment. It is thus hoped that consid-
eration of environmental factors ultimately will achieve a position of 
primary importance in the formulation of agency decisions and that 
the failure of an agency to assign proper importance to these factors 
will provide a basis for challenging its actions. 3 
Proponents of the Act believe that it will accomplish these ends 
by "furnish[ing] the basis for litigating, in both law suits and admin-
istrative proceedings involving major resources, the most basic polit-
ical and philosophical question of whether we must continue to 
equate 'progress' with 'gross national product'; with the accumula-
tion of personal goods; with economic development; with 'miles' of 
roads, 'number' of kilowatts and 'acres of land'."4 In short, by elevat-
ing environmental considerations to a level of critical concern, the 
NEPA potentially provides the environmental lawyer with the legal 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-35 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). See N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1970, at 1, col. l. 
See also Symposium: Control of Environmental Hazards, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1073 (1970), 
discussing existing environmental abuses and the efforts being undertaken to correct 
them. Other congressional efforts to conserve the environment are set forth in Sive, 
Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 
70 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1970). 
2. For the observations of an environmental lawyer on the potential impact of the 
Act, see Sive, supra note I, at 643-50. Chief Judge Brown of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit also expresses a favorable opinion of the Act in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 
F.2d 199, 211-14 (5th Cir. 1970). 
3. See Sive, supra note 1, at 649. See also Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement 
Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in 
Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MicH. L. REv. 1103, 1125-26 (1970). See generally 
Yannacone, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVIRONJ\IENTAL LAw 8 
(1970). 
4. Sive, supra note I, at 644, quoting from a speech by Senator Henry M. Jackson, 
one of the originators of the Act, before the Seattle King County Bar Association, April 
8, 1969. See also Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, The Courts, and the 
Congress, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1073 (1970). 
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basis necessary to challenge effectively the decisions of federal agen-
cies that threaten to harm further our already abused environment.5 
I. THE OPERATION OF THE NEPA 
Subchapter I of the Act, entitled "Policies and Goals," provides 
the means for accomplishing the goals at which the Act is aimed.6 
Subchapter II creates the Council on Environmental Quality, an ex-
ecutive committee designed to assist the President in the formulation 
and evaluation of environmental policies.7 Although subchapter II 
is generally considered to be an important aspect of the Act,8 it is for 
the most part irrelevant to the present discussion. 
Subchapter I begins by specifically spelling out the policies and 
objectives of the Act. Section lOl(a) " ... declares that it is the con-
tinuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all practical 
means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under 
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony .... "9 In 
order to carry out this policy, it is further declared in section IOl(b) 
that it is " ... the continuing responsibility of the Federal Govern-
ment to use all practicable means . . . to improve and coordinate 
Federal plans, functions, programs and resources .... "10 The Act 
then sets forth specific goals toward which these general policies are 
aimed. Simply stated, these goals seek to assure a higher quality of 
life by protecting the environment from abuse by those federal 
agencies that play a large role in the regulation and development of 
environmental quality.11 
5. For extensive criticism of agency activity, and in particular the Army Corps of 
Engineers and the adverse effect its decisions often have on the environment, see Drew, 
Dam Outrage: The Story of the Army Engineers, ATLANTIC, April 1970, at 51, and 
Douglas, The Public Be Damned, PLAYBOY, July 1969, at 143. 
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-35 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
S. See Barry, supra note 3, at 1126, and Sive, supra note 1, at 644. 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 433l(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 433l{b) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
11. The declared goals of the Act are set out in §§ 10l(b)(l)·(6). The full text of 
§ 101 reads: 
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the 
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the 
profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial 
expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances 
and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining en-
vironmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that 
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State 
and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to 
use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical as• 
sistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to 
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of 
present and future generations of Americans. 
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing 
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Section 102 contains very specific provisions designed to regulate 
agency activity in a manner that will compel proper consideration of 
and compliance with the policies and goals set forth in section 101.12 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent 
with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate 
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment 
for succeeding generations; 
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and 
culturally pleasing surroundings; · 
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without 
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended con-
sequences; 
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national 
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports 
diversity and variety of individual choice; 
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit 
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum 
attainable recycling of depletable resources. 
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environ-
ment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation 
and enhancement of the environment. 
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
12. The full text of § 102 reads: 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (I) the 
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and 
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all 
agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the 
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design 
arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's 
environment; 
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the 
Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter, 
which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and 
values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with 
economic and technical considerations; 
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation 
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which 
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall 
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact 
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the ap-
propriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and 
enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the 
Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 
of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review 
processes; 
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended 
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning 
alternative uses of available resources; 
(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental 
problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend 
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maxi-
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Section 102 thus provides tangible standards by which agency deci-
sions may be measured to assure adequate consideration of environ-
mental factors.13 In essence, this section directs agencies "to the full-
est extent possible"14 to incorporate into their decision-making pro-
cesses certain elements that will compel an examination by the agen-
cies of the ecological effects of their decisions and to prepare certain 
studies and reports on the ecological factors involved in recommend-
ing " ... legislation and other major Federal actions ... affecting 
... the environment."15 More specifically, the Act requires federal 
agencies to use an approach to planning and decision-making that 
includes "the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and 
the environmental design arts,''16 and to "identify and develop meth-
ods and procedures" in decision-making that will ensure that envi-
ronmental values will be given "appropriate consideration."17 In 
recommending legislative proposals and federal actions, agencies are 
required to submit a detailed statement (a section 102 report) of 
the impact that the proposal or action would have on the environ-
ment.18 In addition, in cases in which "unresolved conflicts concern-
ing alternative uses of available resources" are involved in an 
agency's recommendations, the agency must develop and present ap-
propriate alternatives to the recommended proposal.19 
Thus, the Act imposes a broad range of new requirements on 
federal agencies that will compel them to act in a manner consistent 
with the stated national policy of environmental preservation and 
improvement. Although it is not yet clear how the courts will inter-
mize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the 
quality of mankind's world environment; 
(F) make available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, and indi-
viduals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and enhancing 
the quality of the environment; 
(G) initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and develop• 
ment of resource-oriented projects; and 
(H) assist the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter 
II of this chapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
Ill. See Sive, supra note 1, at 645, suggesting that "[s]ection 102 ••• may be the 
most far-reaching section of the Act. If the words mean what they seem to say, it may 
profoundly affect the operation of, and the scope of court review of resource determina-
tions made by, all agencies of the Federal Government." 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). The Council on Environmental Qual-
ity (CEQ) has issued guidelines for the section 102 reports. Interim Guidelines for 
Federal Agencies Under the National Environmental Policy Act, BNA ENVIRONMENT 
R.PTR.-FEDERAL Uws 71:0301 (1970). Russell Train, chairman of the CEQ, has recently 
proposed a revision to the guidelines that will make them available to the public at an 
earlier date. BNA ENVIRONMENT R.PTR.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1054 (1971). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
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pret the Act, 20 it does seem reasonably clear that these new require-
ments contain the potential for significantly increasing the scope of 
judicial review of administrative decisions. Since noncompliance with 
these standards will presumably provide the basis for effectively chal-
lenging agency decisions,21 a more viable foundation for judicial re-
view is established.22 It has been suggested that the Act has thus 
increased the ability of individuals and interest groups to mount a 
successful challenge to agency decisions in three major areas: 
(1) providing a number of new "relevant factors" which will have to 
be weighed by the agencies to whom the Act is applicable ... ; (2) 
setting forth a clear statutory direction that the expertise required 
to determine whether a power plant, dam or dike, expressway or ski 
development, is not simply that of the Federal Power Commision, 
the Army Engineers, the Department of Transportation or the 
Forest Service, respectively; and (3) declaring that environmental 
rights are, if not "all that makes life worth living," at least of suf-
ficient importance "to impose greater burdens of proof, and/or 
more thoroughgoing judicial review" than rights in many other 
fields not currently the subject of critical nationwide involvement.23 
The requirement that an agency submit a section 102 report in 
making its recommendations24 likewise provides a potential basis for 
judicial review of agency decisions to the extent that an agency de-
cision may be attacked because of a failure to submit a report or be-
cause the report that was submitted may have been insufficient or 
fraudulent. However, it should be noted that the range of circum-
stances requiring the submission of these reports has not yet been de-
fined and, therefore, the actual effectiveness of the report require-
ment is, as yet, undertermined.25 One crucial question yet to be de-
termined is whether an agency, as part of its annual budgetary re-
quests, 26 must submit a section 102 report each year on every pro-
20. For a brief analysis and review of pending cases in which courts may interpret 
the Act, see Sive, supra note 1, at 649 n.203. 
21. See Yannacone, supra note 3, at 30-31. 
22. See Sive, supra note 1, discussing pre-existing foundations for challenging agency 
decisions. For a specific treatment of federal water pollution control legislation, see 
Barry, supra note 3. 
23. Sive, supra note 1, at 649-50. 
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). See note 18 supra and accompanying 
text. The requirements for the contents of the section 102 reports are set out in 
42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(C)(i)-(v) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). See note 12 supra. 
25. For example, the interpretation of what constitutes "actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment" (42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (Supp. V, 1965-1969)) 
will have a tremendous significance on the effectiveness of the report requirement. See 
Sive, supra note 1, at 645-49. It should be noted that at the present time, there are no 
reported cases construing the scope of this section. 
26. The National Budget and Audit System Act, 31 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), requires 
each department head to prepare requests for yearly appropriations that are submitted 
to Congress under 31 U.S.C. § 11 (1964). To the extent that these requests for appro• 
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ject that it is considering or is presently undertaking. If the courts in-
terpret the Act so that such annual reports are required, then agency 
decisions made prior to the enactment of the Act may nonetheless 
be made subject to the requirements of this section each year. 
In effect, then, the NEPA seeks to achieve a national goal of pro-
viding a harmonious relationship between man and his environment. 
On a general level, the Act pursues this objective by attempting to 
create a widespread awareness of the dangers of environmental ex-
ploitation and by establishing a national priority of preventing and 
rectifying such abuse. More specifically, section 102 of the Act pro-
vides a set of standards by which the courts can gauge agency activity 
to determine whether proper consideration has been given to envi-
ronmental factors. This latter provision furnishes the real operative 
thrust of the Act; for by providing these standards, the Act furnishes 
litigants with a sound basis for imposing upon federal agencies the 
duty of compliance with the announced national commitment to en-
vironmental preservation. 
II. THE R.ETROACTIVITY ISSUE 
As noted above, the requirements of the Act are applicable to all 
federal agency activity having environmental ramifications.27 Federal 
agencies perform two separate kinds of activities that may have an 
impact on the environment. First, as part of their regulatory func-
tion, certain agencies are charged with granting licenses to private 
developers.28 In this situation it is the regulated activity of the pri-
vate developer that has a direct impact on the environment.29 Sec-
ond, agencies initiate and direct projects of their own that often are 
monumental undertakings affecting vast areas of land and involving 
millions of dollars for a single project.30 Regardless of which of the 
above two functions an agency performs, however, the resulting ac-
priations are seen as "proposals for legislation," a section 102 report will be required 
to accompany each annual request. See note 18 supra. 
27. See text accompanying notes 9-17 supra. 
28. For example, private and public projects that affect navigable waters must be 
licensed by the Army Corps of Engineers under 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964). Electric-power 
projects, such as hydroelectric dams, must be licensed by the Federal Power Commis-
sion under 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1964). Also, the Department of Transportation processes 
applications for highway development under 49 U.S.C. § 1655(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V, 
1965-1969), amending 23 U.S.C. § 117 (1964). 
29. See generally Douglas, supra note 5. 
30. Probably the most well-known agencies that conduct this type of activity 
are the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department 
of the Interior. The magnitude of their operations is illustrated by the size of the 
Corps' budget, which last year amounted to $1.3 billion. Douglas, supra note 5, at 182. 
Among the most well-known of the projects undertaken by such agencies are the 
Central Arizona Project, the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, and the Trinity River Project. 
See Drew, supra note 5, at 56-60. 
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Fivities and projects frequently involve several phases, from initial 
planning to final construction, that stretch over a period of many 
years.31 The construction of dams and superhighways are familiar 
examples of this type of project. A number of such projects presently 
· exist that were begun, to one degree or another, prior to enactment 
of the NEP A.32 All of these projects possess the potential for inflict-
ing long-range damage on the environment that might have been 
prevented if the standards and requirements of the NEPA had been 
applied to the initial agency decision. Projects and agency decisions 
of this type will be the subject of an increasing amount of litigation 
as more individuals and conservation groups seize on the potential of 
the NEPA to eradicate environmental abuse.33 These attempts to re-
open agency decisions to scrutiny under the NEPA will raise a two-
fold inquiry. First, did Congress intend the NEPA to apply retroac-
tively? Second, if Congress did intend the NEPA to apply retroac-
tively, is such an application constitutionally valid? This Note will 
examine the issues presented by retroactive application of the NEPA 
and will propose a guide for the resolution of cases in which the is-
sues arise.84 
A. Recent Cases 
Litigation on the issue of the retroactivity of the NEPA has been 
minimal.· Those courts that have addressed the issue have tended to 
deal with it only summarily. There have been, however, several re-
cent federal district court cases and one case in the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit that have presented the question of retroactivity 
to some extent. Although these decisions have not definitively an-
swered the entire range of problems raised by retroactive application 
of the NEPA and therefore do not seem to provide strong authority 
for the resolution of the issue, an examination of these cases does 
present a useful starting point for the present analysis. 
31. For example, the Trinity River Project to build a navigable canal connecting 
the Dallas-Fort Worth area with the Gulf of Mexico was first proposed several years 
ago. It was authorized by Congress in 1962, but no funds were appropriated for the 
project until the last days of President Johnson's Administration. As yet no con-
struction has begun. Drew, supra note 5, at 56-57. 
32. E.g., the Cross-Florida Barge Canal, the Trinity River Project, the Central 
Arizona Project, and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Project, all of which predate in con-
ception, if not in inception and completion, the passage of the NEPA. See generally 
Drew, supra note 5. 
33. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra. 
34. For analysis of the general problems of retroactive application of statutes, see 
Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 
73 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1960), and Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations 
in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 216 (1960). See also Stimson, Retroactive 
Application of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38 MICH. L. REv. 30 (1939), 
and Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Juris-
prudence, 20 MINN. L. REv. 775 (1936). 
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In only one case has a federal court of appeals reached the ques--
tion of retroactivity. In Zabel v. Tabb,85 the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that the standards set out in the NEPA applied to 
a licensing decision of the Army Corps of Engineers even though 
that decision was made prior to the enactment of the Act. The de-
cision in question was the denial by the Corps of a licensing applica-
tion on the grounds that the project in question would be detrimen-
tal to the environment. Plaintiffs contended that under the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899,86 which authorizes the Corps' licensing ac-
tivity, the Corps had authority to withhold a license only if the pro-
ject in question would obstruct navigation. The court rejected this 
contention, finding a sufficient basis to uphold the Corps' decision 
under still another federal law, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act.87 The court nonetheless went to great lengths to show the ap-
plicability of the NEPA.38 Little light was shed upon the retroactivity 
issue, however, since the court's discussion of that question was lim-
ited to the brief statement that "the correctness of that decision [to 
deny the license application] must be determined by the applicable 
standards of today."89 Thus, the court merely assumed the retroactive 
application of the Act without any further elaboration. 
In Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States,40 de-
cided prior to Zabel, the Federal District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas likewise was confronted with a challenge to an agency 
decision made prior to the enactment of the NEPA. The question of 
retroactivity was raised in an action to enjoin construction on the 
challenged project pending the appeal of an adverse judgment on the 
merits. Because of the peculiar nature of the action, the court deter-
mined that the injunction should issue upon a showing that "the 
plaintiffs have a reasonable chance of success" on appeal.41 The court 
found that the plaintiffs did have a reasonable chance to succeed, and 
therefore granted the injunction. Since no money had been distrib-
uted in connection with the disputed project, the court concluded 
that agency action had not been finalized prior to the passage of the 
NEPA and that therefore application of the Act would not be retro-
active. Stating that it was not necessary to pass on the question 
!15. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970). 
!16. !Ill U.S.C. § 403 (1964). 
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1964), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 662, 664, 666 (Supp. V, 
1965-1969), discussed at 430 F.2d at 209. 
38. The court's interpretation of the language of the Act was that " ••• every fed-
eral agency shall consider ecological factors when dealing with activities which may 
have an impact on man's environment." 430 F.2d at 211. 
39. 430 F.2d at 213. 
40. 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT R.Prn.-DECISIONs 1303 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 1970), dismissed 
as moot, 430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970). 
41. 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT R.Prn.-DECISIONS at 1303. 
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whether the Act should be applied retroactively,42 the court empha-
sized the "strong and clear" language of the statute48 to support the 
decision to apply the Act: 
Congress has recognized the "critical importance of restoring and 
maintaining environmental quality." In very repetitive language, 
Congress has made clear that it intends to "use all practical means 
and measures ... to preserve" the "natural aspects of our national 
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which 
supports diversity and variety of individual choice.''44 
Although the court in Texas Committee expressly refrained from 
deciding the question of retroactive application of the NEPA,4r, the 
language it employed would apply with equal force to a case of retro-
active application, and it may be inferred that, had that question 
been squarely presented, the court would have reached the same re-
sult. But in light of the court's avoidance of the retroactivity ques-
tion and the subsequent decision of the Fifth Circuit in Zabel,46 the 
Texas Committee decision does not have any substantial precedential 
value. It is, nonetheless, useful to the present analysis as indicative 
of a possible judicial preference for retroactive application of the 
NEPA. 
This construction of the Act, however, has not been universally 
accepted by the courts. In a case decided prior to the decision of the 
Fifth Circuit in Zabel and after the decision of the district court in 
Texas Committee, a federal district court sitting in Pennsylvania held 
in Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Incorporated v. Bartlett41 
that the NEPA was not intended to apply retroactively. In that case, 
the plaintiff sued to enjoin construction of a secondary highway that 
would allegedly cause serious and irreparable damage to a trout 
stream, basing his claim, at least partially, on the application of the 
NEPA to the decision of the Secretary of Transportation approving 
the project. Since that decision had been made before the enactment 
of the NEPA, the court was faced squarely with the issue of retro-
42. l BNA ENVIRONMENT RP'IR.-DECISIONS at 1303. 
43. l BNA ENVIRONMENT RnR.-DECISIONS at 1304. 
44. 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT RnR.-DECISIONS at 1304. 
45. "[I]t will not be necessary to pass on the [question "whether the statute should 
be applied retroactively'1·" 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT RnR.-DECISIONS at 1303. 
46. Note that the district court that decided Texas Committee sits within the 
Fifth Circuit and, therefore, its decision was subject to review by the court of appeals 
for that circuit. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the suit as moot because the 
disputed project had been abandoned. The question of retroactivity was not considered. 
430 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970). 
47. 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1970). For recent cases applying the reasoning 
of Bartlett, see Brooks v. Volpe, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT R.Pn.-DECISIONS 1004 (W .D. 
Wash. Sept. 25, 1970), and Investment Syndicate v. Richmond, 1 BNA ENvIRONMENT 
RPra.-DECISIONS 1713 (D. Ore. Oct. 27, 1970). 
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activity. The court, after expressly refusing to follow the reasoning of 
the Texas Committee decision, concluded that Congress had not in-
tended the NEPA to be applied retroactively.48 The process by which 
the court reached this conclusion, however, seems rather dubious. 
The court first cited a rule of construction creating a presumption 
against the retroactive application of legislation49 and then held that 
this presumption had not been defeated by the language of the Act. 
Specifically, the court cited-out of context-the phrases "to use all 
practicable means and measures" and "to the fullest extent possible" 
from sections IOI and 102 of the Act,60 reaching the somewhat mirac-
ulous conclusion that these phrases are indicative of a "moderate, 
flexible and pragmatic approach • • • hardly of the type that would 
evidence a retroactive intent.''111 
This analysis by the court in Bartlett of legislative intent does 
not appear adequately to dispose of the retroactivity issue. That 
court's conclusion that the NEPA was not intended to be applied 
retroactively is based solely on the inference that Congress meant to 
take a "moderate approach" to the application of the Act. 62 This 
would seem to be a doubtful inference since it is based solely on two 
phrases that, even when taken out of context, do not lend any appar-
ent support to that inference. Moreover, even if these phrases are 
taken to be indicative of such an intent, this inference seems to be a 
rather shaky basis upon which to rest the conclusion that retroactive 
application of the Act is precluded. This latter point is especially 
telling in light of the congressional intent that emerges from a more 
thorough analysis of the statutory language and legislative history 
such as that undertaken below.113 Even accepting the validity of an 
initial presumption against retroactivity, therefore, the shortcomings 
of the Bartlett decision rob it of much of its persuasiveness. 
Thus, as exemplified by the cases discussed above, 114 the decisions 
48. 315 F. Supp. at 247-48. 
49. The court drew its rule of construction from two Supreme Court decisions: 
"As the Court said in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 
190, 199 ••• 'the first rule of construction is that legislation must be considered 
as addressed to the future, not to the past • • • fand] a retrospective operation will 
not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights • • • unless 
auch be "the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest 
intention of the legislature."'" Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 ••• 
(1964). 
815 F. Supp. at 247-48 (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court has not 
applied this rule of construction in all cases in which it has interpreted the intent 
of the legislature. See, e.g., McNair v. Knott, 302 U.S. 369 (1937). 
50. See notes 11·12 supra for the full text of these sections, 
51. 315 F. Supp. at 248. 
52. 315 F. Supp. at 248. 
53. See text accompanying notes 57-8!1 infra. 
54. See text accompanying notes 35-51 supra. 
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dealing with the issue of retroactivity of the NEPA are less than dis-
positive of the issue. Not only have the courts' analyses of congres-
sional intent been incomplete and therefore not determinative, but 
the courts have not even reached the second phase of the inquiry-
the constitutionality of retroactive application. Therefore, a more 
thorough examination of both phases of the retroactivity issue is 
necessary. 
B. Congressional Intent 
The first question to be faced in deciding whether a statute 
should be applied retroactively is whether Congress intended for it 
to be so applied. 55 There are two ways that a statute may be inter-
preted to have retroactive effect. First, a statute is retroactive if it 
specifies a date prior to its enactment as the date that it is to become 
effective. 56 Second, a statute may be found to be retroactive if its pro-
visions, which become effective at its date of enactment, affect rights 
that were established and transactions that took place prior to its 
enactment.57 While it is clear that there is no language in the NEPA 
stating that it should become effective on a certain date prior to its 
enactment, there is language in the Act which indicates a congres-
sional intent that the provisions of the Act apply to rights that were 
established and transactions that took place prior to its enactment. 
In interpreting the language of the Act, it is important to keep in 
mind the well-settled rule of construction that legislative intent is 
properly ascertained not from an examination of certain phrases 
viewed in isolation but from a reading of the statute as a whole, with 
particular attention given to its policies and objectives.68 It should 
be noted that it was the failure of the court in Bartlett to follow this 
rule that permitted it to conclude that Congress did not intend the 
NEPA to be applied retroactively.69 As the following analysis dem-
onstrates, this decision was probably erroneous; for reading the 
55. See note 34 supra and preceding text. 
56. For instance, a tax statute may provide that its effective date be prior to its 
date of enactment. See, e.g., United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 (1963). 
57. Justice Story, articulating this bifurcated standard, "stated that 'retroactive' 
embraced not only laws that were 'enacted to take effect from a time anterior to 
their passage,' but also covered 'all statutes, which, though operating only from 
their passage, affect vested rights and past transactions • • • .' " Slawson, supra note 
34, at 218. 
58. See e.g., the language of the Supreme Court in Richards v. United States, 869 
U.S. 1, 11 (1962), dealing with a problem of statutory interpretation: 
We believe it fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isola-
tion from the context of the whole act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in 
interpreting legislation, "we must not be guided by a single sentence or member 
of a sentence, but [should] look to the provision of the whole law, and to its 
object and policy." 
See also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 850 U.S. 270, 285 (1956). 
59. See text accompanying notes 47-58 supra. 
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NEPA as a whole, it is apparent that Congress did envision retroac-
tive application of the Act. 
This congressional intent is reflected in various ways. In addition 
to the policy statements set forth above, 60 the Act also states that " ... 
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use 
all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations 
of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, func-
tions, programs, and resources .... "61 The Act further states, in sec-
tion 102, that "[t]he Congress authorizes and directs that, to the full-
est extent possible: (I) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the 
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance 
with the policies set forth in this Chapter, and (2) all agencies of the 
Federal Government shall ... [apply the standards of the Act]."62 If 
this language is interpreted in its ordinary sense, 63 it is difficult to 
conclude that Congress did not intend the Act to be applied to those 
projects and agency decisions to which it can in fact be applied, re-
gardless of whether they predate the enactment of the statute. More-
over, as previously noted,64 the goals of the Act are ambitious and 
keyed to a broad, long-range improvement of the environment. 
When the phrases "to the fullest extent possible"65 and "to use all 
practicable means and measures"66-which were relied on in Bartlett 
to deny retroactive effect67-are read in context with all of the other 
provisions of the Act, as well as with the policies and objectives of 
the Act, the only correct interpretation would seem to be that if the 
requirements of the Act can feasibly be applied-even if the project 
in question was begun prior to enactment of the NEPA-then they 
should in fact be applied. Indeed, these very phrases, when placed in 
context, appear, contrary to the decision in Bartlett, to be strongly 
indicative of a congressional intent that the NEPA be applied retro-
actively.68 
The legislative history of the Act also supports the conclusion 
that Congress intended it to be applied retroactively.69 References in 
60. See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra. 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 433l(b) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
63. "After all, legislation when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to 
the common run of men and is therefore to be understood according to the sense 
of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed 
to him." NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 268 (1956), quoting Addison 
v. Holy Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944). See also Crane v. Commissioner, lllll U.S. 
1 (1946). 
64. See text accompanying note 11 supra. 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 4!132 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
66. 42 U.S,C. § 433l(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
67. See text accompanying note 51 supra. 
68. See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra. 
69. For examples of cases in which the Supreme Court has looked to legislative 
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the House and Senate reports on the Act to the urgency of the need 
for as much immediate action as possible and to the far-reaching im-
pact of all decisions affecting the environment are indicative of such 
intent: 
The Nation has in many areas overdrawn its bank account ..•• 
The survival of man, in a world in which decency and dignity are 
possible, is the basic reason for bringing man's impact on his en-
vironment under informed and responsible control. ... If we fail to 
do this in an adequate and timely manner, we may find ourselves 
confronted, even in this generation, with an environmental catastro-
phe that could render our wealth meaningless and which no amount 
of money could ever cure.7o 
This strong statement of policy establishes as a major objective of the 
Act the development of a program that will begin immediately to 
cope with problems that may have a lasting and irretrievable effect 
on the environment. Furthermore, in reference to section 102,71 the 
Senate report stated that "environmental management functions," 
authorized by this section of the Act and "necessary to support the 
policies established" by the Act, are to be implemented "as a part of 
their [the federal agencies] existing programs and their ongoing ac-
tivities."72 This language would seem to indicate that at least section 
102 of the Act, which contains the most specific requirements govern-
ing agency activity,73 was intended by Congress to apply to programs 
and projects in existence at the time the legislation was enacted. 
Further support for the conclusion that Congress intended the 
Act to be applied retroactively can be garnered by examining the spe-
cific abuses that the provisions of the NEPA are aimed at correcting. 
For it is an accepted rule of construction, especially with regard to 
remedial statutes, that".:. a statute must be so construed as to make 
it effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted; and if the rea-
son of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in 
the future, then it will be so applied, although the statute does not, 
in terms, so direct . . .. "74 Applying this rule to the abuses that 
prompted the adoption of the NEPA, it is apparent that the Act 
should be applied retroactively. An examination of the legislative 
history reveals that the passage of the NEPA resulted not only from 
an awareness on the part of Congress that time is running out in 
history to aid in statutory interpretation, see United States v. Zacks, 375 U.S. 59 
(1963), and Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962). 
70. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1969). 
71. Section 102 was originally labeled section 201 and is referred to as such in the 
Senate report. 
72. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1969) (emphasis added). 
73. See note 12 supra. 
74. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 170 F.2d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1948). 
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man's bid to correct past abuses of the environment, but also from a 
realization that a significant part of the cure is to insure that federal 
agencies will not continue to be a major source of the problem.75 
Much of the impetus for the enactment of the NEPA came from an 
awareness of the fact that many agency decisions and projects simply 
were not in the best interests of environmental control.76 As the 
Senate report on the NEPA stated, "[v]irtually every agency of the 
Federal Government plays some role in determining how well the 
environment is managed. Yet, many of these agencies do not have a 
mandate, a body of law, or a set of policies to guide their actions 
which have an impact on the environment."77 It would be ironic in-
deed if Congress did not intend to affect, as much as possible, those 
pro,iects and decisions that provided the impetus for the Act. Ac-
cordingly, an application of the rule of statutory construction out-
lined above appropriately seems to compel the conclusion that Con-
gress contemplated retroactive application of the Act. 
Thus, upon a thorough analysis of the language and the legis-
lative history of the Act, it seems rather clear that Congress intended 
the NEPA to apply retroactively. This is not to say, however, that 
there is no limit to the reach of that intent. In fact, careful scrutiny 
of the language of the Act indicates that Congress has cautiously 
guarded against unfettered retroactive application. Specifically, those 
phrases relied upon in the Bartlett opinion prescribe certain opera-
tive limitations.78 For instance, the federal government is directed 
"to use all practicable means" to achieve environmental balance.79 
Similarly, section 102 requires that the goals of the Act be pursued 
"to the fullest extent possible."80 While these limitations certainly 
do not negate the conclusion that retroactivity was intended, but, 
instead, seem to support that conclusion,81 they do indicate that a 
degree of reasonable restraint is contemplated in the retroactive 
application of the Act. This particular issue arises again in connec-
tion with the constitutional issues discussed below and will be ex-
amined more fully there.82 For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
75. See generally S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-17 (1969), and H.R. REP. 
No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3·8 (1969). 
76. Id. 
77. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969). Similarly, the House report 
states, "[iJt is a simple fact of life that policies of agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment may and do conflict: it is equally true that there are occasions where, without 
benefits of conflicting policies, these government agencies may and do adopt courses 
that appear to conflict with the general public interest." H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969). 
78. See text accompanying notes 47-53 supra. 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 433I(a) (Supp. V, 1965-1969) (emphasis added). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
81. See text accompanying note 68 supra. 
82. See text accompanying notes 113-18 infra, 
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note that these limitations exist and that they will require as a part 
of the inquiry in each individual case that the court consider whether 
the challenged project has progressed so far that it is no longer 
practicable to apply the standards of the Act. In essence, then, the 
ultimate conclusion is that Congress intended the NEPA to be ap-
plied retroactively subject only to the practical limitation of reason-
ableness. It appears, therefore, that the Fifth Circuit was correct in 
holding in Zabel that the acceptability of existing agency decisions 
and projects "must be determined by the applicable standards of 
today"83-that is, by the standards set forth in the NEPA. 
C. The Constitutionality of Retroactive 
Application of the NEPA 
Reaching the conclusion that Congress intended the NEPA to 
be applied retroactively, however, does not end the inquiry. Even if 
it is assumed that retroactivity was intended, the question still re-
mains whether such an application of the Act is constitutionally 
permissible. Traditionally, retroactive legislation has been viewed 
with suspicion for two fundamental reasons: 84 it may be passed with 
a specific knowledge of who will benefit from retroactive applica-
tion, 85 and it does not allow people to plan their conduct in line 
with reasonably stable legal consequences.86 As to the first reason, 
legislation may be passed, for example, that confers financial benefit 
retroactively on a certain class of persons who are known to the legis-
lators at the time of enactment. Or, retroactive legislation may be 
passed that has a detrimental effect on a class of persons designated 
by the legislature with knowledge of whom the legislation will 
affect.87 This first objection to retroactivity is hardly applicable to 
the NEPA, however, since the known beneficiaries of the Act are 
the public and future generations who may be spared the burden 
of environmental blight caused by misdirected federal agencies. 
These beneficiaries will not receive any sudden financial windfall 
from underhanded legislation nor will the Act inure to their detri-
ment_. It does not appear, therefore, that this reason for disfavoring 
retroactive legislation is relevant to the NEPA. 
83. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 213 (5th Cir. 1970). 
84. Hochman, supra note 34, at 692-93. 
85. Id. at 693. 
86. According to Hochman, id. at 692, this second reason was recognized in THI.': 
FEDERALIST No. 44, at 279 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (Madison). The constitutional provisions 
used as a basis for attacking retroactive legislation are the contract clause, U.S. CoNST. 
art. I, § 10, and the due process clauses, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
87. It has been noted that this type of retroactive legislation is somewhat analogous 
to ex post facto laws in the criminal area, which are prohibited by U.S. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 9. Slawson, supra note 34, at 221-25. 
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It is true, however, that retroactive application of the NEPA may 
undermine the reasonable reliance of some individuals or corpora-
tions that they were entering into a legally stable relationship when 
dealing with a federal agency. This second reason for disfavoring 
retroactivity goes to the heart of the constitutional arguments for 
and against retroactive application. The constitutional basis for an 
attack on the retroactive application of a federal civil statute is 
found in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.88 The 
fundamental contention is that retroactive application of the statute 
in question will deprive the injured party of property without due 
process of law and that such application would therefore be uncon-
stitutional. 89 As with other due process problems, the approach of 
the Court in assessing the constitutionality of a retroactive statute 
has generally been to balance the interests of the individual against 
the interests of society to determine whether the encroachment on 
individual rights is reasonably justified.90 The outcome of each case, 
therefore, will turn on the facts peculiar to that case. 
Thus, it is apparent that challenges to the constitutionality of 
the retroactive application of a statute may arise in various factual 
contexts. While it is obviously impossible to examine each possible 
fact situation under a given statute, it is helpful to isolate relevant 
factors and to examine the constitutional consequences resulting 
from the variation of these factors. In the case of the NEPA, the 
relevant factual variation lies in the extent of the reliance that has 
been placed on an agency decision.91 Basically, the possible factual 
variations under the Act may be grouped into two major classes, 
each having identifiable constitutional ramifications. The first class 
of cases are those in which the agency decision has led to the creation 
of no private interests prior to enactment of the NEPA. In these cases 
a change in the original agency decision in order to conform to the 
Act's standards will not interfere with any assertable private rights. 
Zabel is an example of such a case.92 There, the Corps of Engineers 
originally decided against a proposed project. As a result there was 
no contract, no reliance by the plaintiff, and hence no rights arising 
from the agency decision. A similar situation would exist in those 
88. "No person shall be ••• deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com• 
pensation." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. 
89. See, e.g., Home Bldg. &: Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Lynch v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). 
90. See Hochman, supra note ll4, at 694-95, and Slawson, supra note 34, at 251. 
91. See Hochman, supra note 34 at 727, concluding that the factor most often 
considered by the Court in assessing the private interests involved in a constitutional 
challenge to retroactive application of a statute is the "extent to which the parties 
have laid reasonable reliance" on existing legal norms. See also Slawson, supra note 34, 
at 225-30. 
92. 430 F.2d at 199. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra. 
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cases in which a federal agency had decided, prior to enactment of 
the NEPA, to commence a project, but had not taken any affirmative 
action to implement that decision-for example, calling for bids, 
letting any contracts, or beginning actual construction93-by the 
time the Act's standards are sought to be applied. 
The second class of cases is comprised of those in which the 
challenged agency action has progressed to the point that some 
valid private rights have been established in reliance on the agency 
decision. This category includes all those situations in which the 
agency has taken some affirmative action to commence a project. 
Although the court in Texas Committee did not base its decision on 
a retroactive application of the NEPA-and, indeed, did not even 
have to face the constitutional issue since the park developers were 
not parties to the action-the factual situation in that case is instruc-
tive of the type of reliance that exists in this second class of cases. 
In Texas Committee, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) had 
approved a loan to a park project that the plaintiffs claimed would 
have detrimental environmental effects. The only step that remained 
to complete agency activity was for the money to be handed over to 
the park developers.94 While the decision does not indicate posi-
tively, it may be assumed that a contract existed between the FHA 
and the park developers. It is obvious that the abandonment of the 
park project would have adversely affected the interests of the de-
velopers who had contracted in reliance on the prior agency decision. 
Similarly, in Bartlett, construction on the contested road proiect had 
already begun when the plaintiffs attempted to challenge the deci-
sion approving the project on the basis of retroactive application 
of the NEP A.95 Although it appears from the record that construc-
tion was still in an early stage,96 the abrogation of the interests of 
those who contracted for and began work upon the project is ap-
parent. 
Thus, it is only in this second class of cases that the constitutional 
arguments against the retroactive application of the Act are relevant 
since only in this class are reliance interests affected. It should be noted, 
however, that within this class the extent of the reliance may vary 
considerably. Accordingly, the severity of the adverse effects caused 
by abandonment or modification of the project in question will 
also vary. This variation in the extent of the reliance involved will, 
of course, directly affect the degree of societal interest required to 
overcome constitutional objections. Thus, in examining the balanc-
93. E.g., the Central Arizona Project. See J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING &: Poucv 
5-29 (1968). 
94. 1 BNA ENVIRONMENT RP!R.-DECISIONS at 1303. 
95. :515 F. Supp. at 243. See text accompanying notes 47-5:5 supra. 
96. See 315 F. Supp. at 243. 
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ing process that will be used to test the constitutionality of retro-
active application, it should be kept in mind that the greater the re-
liance by the party challenging such an application, the more likely 
it becomes that retroactive enforcement of the NEPA will be viewed 
as a deprivation of that party's property without due process of law. 
Constitutional objections to retroactive statutes are usually 
phrased in terms of an abrogation of a "vested right" of the injured 
party.97 Plaintiffs allege that vested rights are the property of 
which they have been deprived without due process of law in 
violation of the fifth amendment. In essence, the argument against 
the constitutionalii:y of retroactive enforcement of the Act is that 
the agency decision induced the aggrieved party to act in reliance 
on it, thereby establishing a vested right in the regular completion 
of the project. By abandoning or modifying the project to the detri-
ment of this vested right, that right-the property protected by the 
due process clause-is abrogated, and unless the corresponding 
societal benefit outweighs the private detriment inflicted, retroactive 
application of the NEPA will be an unconstitutional infringement 
on the right so asserted.9B 
For example, a suit brought by an interested party may force a 
re-evaluation of an agency decision in order to bring that decision 
into line with the standards of the Act. This reopening of an agency 
decision may lead to alterations in the scope and design of a project 
or in some cases may lead to the total abandonment of the project.99 
Similar results may be reached in those cases in which a project is 
attacked because an agency has failed to submit a report under 
section 102(C) in its annual appropriation requests.100 In any of 
97. Hochman, supra note !14, at 696; Slawson, supra note !14, at 218. See, e.g., 
Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 170 
F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1948). 
98. For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the only persons with standing to 
assert such a vested right are private individuals and corporations. Thus, the federal 
agencies involved are presumed to be without standing to assert such rights. Even 
where an agency has expended money and manpower on a project that is subsequently 
stopped under the Act, it cannot assert a right against a congressional mandate that 
it must operate in a specific manner. For example, in Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 
316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942), the Supreme Court, in ruling that a federal agency 
cannot exercise its power unmindful of other statutes, stated: "Frequently the entire 
scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme 
to another, and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it 
undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis upon its immediate task." 
See also Local Lodge No. 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960). 
99. For example, a plaintiff may successfully contend that in deciding to proceed 
on a project, an agency did not sufficiently consider the alternatives under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4332(C) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), and therefore the decision is invalid because it violates 
the standards laid down by Congress in the Act. On this basis an injunction could 
be obtained halting further progress on the project in question. 
100. The efficacy of this argument has not yet been determined by any court. See 
note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
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these cases the vested rights of contractors on the project in question 
will be abrogated if the project is altered significantly or stopped 
altogether.101 If this abrogation of vested rights is to be constitution-
ally justified, the benefit to the public must outweigh the detriment 
suffered by the aggrieved party. 
Before a court can engage in any meaningful balancing of in-
terests, however, it is first necessary to identify the nature of the 
reliance by the party challenging the retroactive application of the 
Act.102 If the only change in status resulting from a retroactive ap-
plication of the Act is an alteration in the project, those alterations 
will probably be accounted for in the original contract.103 Therefore, 
the financial loss will be eliminated or greatly minimized and the 
argument that vested rights have been abrogated by retroactive ap-
plication of the NEPA will either not arise or will be diminished 
to a point of insignificance. In cases in which an agency decision is 
reopened under the NEPA104 and, as a result, the entire project is 
cancelled, those parties who are injured by termination of a contract 
will lose a vested right that had been established in reliance on the 
legal situation existing at the time the contract was made.105 
With the nature of these interests in mind, it is next necessary 
to tum to the other side of the scales in the balancing process to 
evaluate the societal interests that are at stake. Comparing these 
interests with the private rights involved, it becomes apparent that 
if retroactive application of the NEPA is declared unconstitutional 
because it interferes with some pre-existing individual rights, the 
Government will be effectively precluded from acting in a compre-
hensive manner to protect the public interest in a decent environ-
ment. To the extent that congressional action could correct abuses 
101. For more specific examples of how these rights are so abrogated, see text 
accompanying notes 94-95 supra. 
102. See text following note 90 supra. 
103. Government construction contracts contain a standard provision for unilateral 
contract changes by the contracting agency that provides for equitable adjustment of 
cost changes. See generally Nash &: Cibinic, The Changes Clause in Federal Construc-
tion Contracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 908 (1967). 
104. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra. 
105. Of course, if the agency that is forced to terminate the contract gives the 
private contractor his profit expectation on the breached contract, the private con-
tractor will not have been deprived of his vested right in the contract and will not 
have a basis for a constitutional attack on the NEPA. 
The cancellation of a project may also abrogate the vested right of a party even 
though no contract has actually been entered into. For example, an agency may an-
nounce a new project and call for bids on that project. If a contractor incurs sub-
stantial expenses in developing his plans for a bid, he will, in effect, have acted in 
reliance on the legal situation existing at the time the bids were called for. If the 
project is then cancelled by a retroactive application of the Act, the contractor should 
still be considered to have lost a vested right established in reliance, even though his 
bid was never accepted and no contract ever entered into. See text following note 93 
supra. 
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now being committed, the need to halt the continuation of poten-
tially damaging projects would be stymied because of the pre-existing 
reliance of those persons who would benefit from the completion of 
such projects. 
Although no cases have dealt directly with a constitutional attack 
on retroactive application of the NEPA,106 unconstitutionality is 
commonly asserted against legislation that affects pre-existing 
rights107 and such assertions may be anticipated in future cases con-
cerning the NEPA. The problem, of course, is not in recognizing 
the issue, but in trying to discern the relevant factors that will in-
fluence the Court's decision. While it is easy to identify the com-
peting public and private interests,1°8 that alone does not provide 
an adequate basis for a determination of the constitutional issue in 
any given case. No clear rules have evolved from Supreme Court 
decisions concerning retroactive legislation, and the analysis applied 
by the Court in one case is often difficult to reconcile with that of 
another case.109 The result is that "[t]he language of the opinions, 
with few exceptions, has been confused and unenlightening,"110 and 
the approach of the Court is muddled by a variety of "sweeping 
generalizations . . . seldom supported by the cases or reason."111 
One commentator has suggested that the proper approach is a 
"fundamental balancing" of interests-private against public.112 
Another commentator has urged application of a three-pronged in-
terest analysis that ultimately rests on drawing a balance between 
the competing interests.113 In some cases the Court appears to have 
used a balancing test of one sort or another,114 while in other cases 
the Court has keyed on the regulatory power of Congress as the 
basis for upholding retroactive legislation.115 A reading of the cases 
in the area does not reveal any single factor as the dominant con-
sideration for judicial determination. It is submitted, however, that 
several identifiable factors do emerge from the Supreme Court de-
cisions dealing with retroactive legislation and that the outcome of 
any given case will ultimately rest on which of these factors appear 
106. The cases have thus far dealt primarily with the question of legislative in-
tent. See notes 85-51 supra and accompanying text. 
107. See Slawson, supra note 84, at 285. 
108. See note 98 supra. 
109. Compare, e.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958) with Chase 
Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945) and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 
U.S. 893 (1922). 
110. Slawson, supra note 84, at 235. 
111. Hochman, supra note 84, at 726-27. 
112. Slawson, supra note 34, at 251. 
113. See generally Hochman, supra note 34. 
114. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
115. See, e.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
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most important to the Court in a particular situation. It is important 
to note that while this type of analysis would seem to imply the use 
of a balancing test, the decisions of the Court often are made with-
out even an implied reference to a balancing analysis.116 Neverthe-
less, while in individual cases there may be no express or implied 
balancing of interests involved, it appears that generally the Court 
has engaged in a comparison of the competing public and private 
interests, and in certain situations has found the existence of specific 
interests on one side or the other to be determinative or, at least, 
deserving of great weight. 
Therefore, while it is obvious that no set formula can be applied 
to the determination of the constitutionality of potential retroactive 
application of the NEPA, the factors that probably would influence 
the decision of the Court can be isolated and evaluated in light of 
the probable constitutional arguments that will be made. In this 
analysis, it will be helpful also to examine cases involving alleged 
violations of the constitutional prohibition against the impairment 
of contractual obligations by the states.117 While the NEPA is a 
federal statute and is not controlled by the contract clause of the 
Constitution, the analysis of retroactivity by the Court in recent 
years under the contract clause and the due process clause has been 
sufficiently similar to permit the ·use of cases in both areas inter-
changeably in the determination of the constitutionality of retro-
active application of the NEPA.118 
The various factors that may be expected to influence the Court's 
decision in any given case challenging retroactive application of the 
NEPA can be broadly identified. The nature of the vested right 
that has been abrogated119 and the amount of reasonable reliance 
by the injured party on the pre-existing legal situation120 are factors 
that focus on the private interests involved. The magnitude of the 
public interest served by retroactive application of the statute in 
question121 and the urgency or need that can be demonstrated in 
support of retroactive application122 measure the public interests 
116. See, e.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 states: "No state shall impair the obligations of con• 
tracts." 
118. See Slawson, supra note 34, at 221, and Hochman, supra note 34, at 695. 
119. E.g., Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932); Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Mottley, 
219 U.S. 467 (1911). For a general treatment of the subject, see Hochman, supra note 
34, at 717-26. 
120. E.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958). See also Slawson, supra 
note 34, at 233. 
121. E.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Veix v. Sixth Ward 
Bldg. &: Loan Assn., 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Treigle v. Acme Homestead Assn., 297 U.S. 
189 (1986). See generally Hochman, supra note 34, at 697-711. 
122. E.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 
U.S. 571 (1934). 
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involved. Additional factors that probably will influence the Court's 
decision include the fact that a government contract, as opposed to 
a private contract, is involved, 128 and the fact that the parties in-
volved are operating in a federally regulated area.124 
Looking first at the private-interest factors, it appears that these 
interests are frequently minimized in the face of otherwise valid 
legislative action. In those cases in which private contractors may 
be deprived of their contract rights or at least their expectation of 
profits from a contract made prior to enactment of the NEPA, it 
seems clear that the statute will have infringed a valid "vested 
right."125 The basis for holding rights under a contract to be vested 
rights is that they represent monetary gain and are established in 
reliance on an existing legal situation.126 However, it is clear that 
the existence of contract rights alone cannot prevent the enforce-
ment of legislation that extinguishes those rights. For example, in 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Afottley,121 the Supreme Court, 
in 1911, held that contract rights existing prior to the enactment of 
a federal statute could be extinguished under the force of that statute 
without violating the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In 
Afottley, a couple injured in a train accident had signed a release 
of their tort claims in consideration for an agreement by the railroad 
to provide free passes for life. Subsequently, Congress passed an act 
prohibiting the issuance of free passes by railroads.128 In holding 
retroactive enforcement of the statute valid despite abrogation of 
the private contract rights, the Court said: 
The agreement between the railroad company and the Mottleys 
must necessarily be regarded as having been made subject to the pos-
sibility that, at some future time, Congress might so exert its whole 
constitutional power in regulating interstate commerce as to render 
that agreement unenforceable or to impair its value. That the exer-
cise of such power may be hampered or restricted to any extent by 
contracts previously made between individuals or corporations, is 
inconceivable. The framers of the Constitution never intended any 
such state of things to exist.129 
'\,Vhile abrogation of private contract rights may in some cases be 
a valid basis for attacking a statute,180 it appears from Mottley that 
123. E.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 
U.S. 571 (1934). See also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948). 
124. E.g., Fleming ·v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947). 
125. See note 105 supra. 
126. Id. See also Hochman, supra note M, at 723, and Slawson, supra note 34, at 233. 
127. 219 U.S. 467 (1911). 
128. Commerce Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 47, §§ 1, 6, M Stat. 838. 
129. 219 U.S. at 482. 
l!O. E.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
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even total abrogation of those rights may not be a sufficient reason 
automatically to hold unconstitutional the retroactive application 
of the statute. Mottley, however, involved a contract between private 
parties. Thus, in the context of the NEPA, the case can be taken as 
authority for no more than the proposition that rights created under 
such private contracts may constitutionally be abrogated by retro-
active application of the NEPA. Such a situation would arise in those 
instances in which a federal agency licensed private interests to 
proceed on a particular project and those private interests let con-
tracts on the project.181 If the agency's licensing decision is success-
fully challenged under the NEPA, then, under the authority of 
Mottley, the private rights asserted by the contractors would appear 
to be subordinate to the congressional power to regulate in the 
area. 
A stronger argument can be made for protection of private con-
tract rights in those cases in which the private party has contracted 
with the Government.182 The reliance of a private party on the ex-
isting legal situation in Government contract cases is more reasonably 
justified since the party is contracting with the government that is 
ultimately responsible for the formulation and maintenance of the 
legal rules in effect. As a result, the Court has been much more dis-
posed to uphold private rights in cases involving Government con-
tracts than in cases involving contracts between private parties. The 
reason that Government contracts are treated with more deference 
arises from the Court's "feeling that it is more unfair to permit a 
party to a contract [i.e., the federal government] to modify its terms 
than for the legislature, as a disinterested body, to alter the rights 
created by a contract between private parties."188 As noted above, 
reliance is one of the fundamental bases for protecting individuals 
against retroactive legislation.184 Since it is more reasonable for a 
private party to rely on performance by the Government than by 
another private party, a more rigid standard is applied in Govern-
ment contract cases.185 Thus, in those cases in which a federal project 
antedating the NEPA is attacked under the NEPA, the fact that a 
Government contract is involved will be a factor that weighs in favor 
of finding that retroactive application of the NEPA is unconstitu-
tional. 
This factor is not always determinative, however, as evidenced 
by several cases upholding retroactive legislation that abrogates pre-
llll. See note 28 supra. 
132. See generally Slawson, supra note 34, at 243. 
133. Hochman, supra note 34, at 723. 
134. See notes 86, 98, &: 105 supra and accompanying text. 
135. Hochman, supra note 34, at 723. 
March 1971] Notes 755 
existing rights under a Government contract.1313 In order to determine 
whether retroactive application of the Act is constitutional in these 
cases, it is necessary to examine other competing factors, particularly 
the public interest involved. 
The extent to which the public interest is served by retroactive 
application of the legislation in question is given substantial weight 
by the Court in the present analysis.187 In fact, if no substantial 
public interest is served by the statute, the Court will not allow 
private rights to be abrogated in deference to it. For example, in 
Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association,138 the Court struck dO"wn 
a state law passed under exercise of the police power because the 
ends served by the law did not serve any "discernible public pur-
pose."189 In the case of the NEPA, however, the strong public in-
terest promoted by the Act is virtually impossible to attack. The 
desire to protect the environment has surfaced in a relatively short 
time to become a major topic of discussion and will no doubt be 
remembered as one of the major issues of this era. As the Senate 
report on the NEPA states: 
As the evidence of environmental decay and degradation mounts, it 
becomes clearer each day that the Nation cannot continue to pay the 
price of past abuse. The costs of air and water pollution, poor land 
use policies and urban decay can no longer be deferred for payment 
by future generations. These problems must be faced while they 
are still of manageable proportions and while alternative solutions 
are still available.Ho 
As a factor that cuts in favor of upholding the constitutionality of 
retroactive application of the NEPA, the strong public interest served 
by the Act should weigh heavily on the ultimate conclusion by the 
Court. As noted by Chief Judge Brown in Zabel, the problems with 
which the NEPA attempts to deal involve "issues of spectacular pub-
lic importance."1U 
While this concern with the strength of public interests would 
seem to imply that such interests are to be weighed against competing 
136. E.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Home Bldg. Be Loan Assn. 
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). 
1!17. For a good general treatment of this factor, see Hochman, supra note !14, 
at 697. 
138. 297 U.S. 189 (1936). 
139. 297 U.S. at 196. The statute in question in Treigle was designed to protect 
savings and loan associations from excessive withdrawals. Although the degree of 
public interest served by the statute arguably was significant, the Court based its 
decision on the conclusion that the public interest served was not sufficiently substan• 
tial. 
140. S. R.EP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969). 
141. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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private interests, several Supreme Court decisions concerning retro-
activity seem to have keyed solely on the existence of the regulatory 
power of Congress, giving little or no deference to the private rights 
involved so long as the regulatory power is valid.142 For example, in 
FHA v. The Darlington, Inc.,148 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of an amendment to the National Housing Act144 
that terminated plaintiff's pre-existing right to rent to transients 
under a Government contract. The Court stated: 
Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously ac-
quired by the person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion. So long as the Constitution authorizes the subsequently 
enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions limit or interfere 
with previously acquired rights does not condemn it. Immunity 
from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded con-
tracts.145 
It is especially significant that Darlington involved a Government 
contract since in such cases the argument is strongest that the re-
liance expectations of the individual should be protected.146 Yet 
the Court applied the same analysis in Darlington that it had ap-
plied in cases involving private contracts.147 Thus, it would seem 
that the Court may give very little weight to private interests-
regardless of their nature-in the face of a valid exercise of the con-
gressional regulatory power. 
This conclusion is fortified by a further aspect of Darlington. 
The Court partially justified its finding that there was no denial of 
due process by the fact that the injured parties were dealing in a 
federally regulated area. As the Court noted, "[t]hose who do busi-
ness in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is 
buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative 
end."148 In cases involving retroactive application of the NEPA, the 
contractors who will be adversely affected are also operating in a reg-
ulated area, as evidenced by the fact that, by definition, they are deal-
ing directly or indirectly with a federal agency clearly subject to 
regulation by Congress, its creator. Moreover, congressional concern 
for environmental protection has been expressed in previous legisla-
142. E.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Louisville & N.R.R. v. 
Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (19ll). 
143. 358 U.S. 84 (1958). 
144. Act of Aug. 2, 1954, ch. 649, § 513(a), 68 Stat. 610, codified in 12 U.S.C. § 173l(b) 
(1964). 
145. 358 U.S. at 91, quoting Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947). 
146. See text accompanying notes 132-35 supra. 
147. E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (19ll). 
148. 358 U.S. at 91. 
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tion.m Therefore, following the logic of the Court in Darlington, 
it is not unreasonable to find the reliance of private contractors on 
reasonably stable legal consequences not to be compelling. In es-
sence, the enactment of the NEPA has merely "buttressed" a pre-
viously expressed congressional concern for environmental quality.150 
Although the legislative scheme of the Act covers the entire range of 
regulation of agency activity rather than a specific aspect of a par-
ticular regulatory scheme as was the case in Darlington,151 the 
reasoning of the Court is equally applicable to cases involving the 
NEPA. In effect, as in Darlington, "Congress .•. [has done] no more 
than [protect] the regulatory system which it had designed."152 
This judicial deference to the regulatory power of Congress is 
further exemplified in cases dealing with the infringement of private 
rights by the exercise of the police power by a state.us In these 
cases, the Court has typically held that reliance on an existing legal 
situation in an area subject to regulation under the police power 
does not establish rights in an individual that can be asserted by 
that individual to avoid the application of subsequent legislation 
that is claimed to be unconstitutional as adversely affecting the 
rights established in reliance. For example, in Queenside Hills Com-
pany v. Saxl,11H the Court upheld a newly enacted fire ordinance 
that resulted in substantial economic loss to a property owner who 
had been in full compliance with the old law. The property owner 
was forced, at great expense, to comply with the new ordinance or 
lose his income from a noncomplying apartment building. In up-
holding the ordinance, the Court stated, "[i]n no case does the owner 
of property acquire immunity against exercise of the police power 
because he constructed it [the apartment building] in full compliance 
with the existing laws."155 Thus, despite the great economic loss 
suffered by the individual, the ordinance was held to be a constitu-
tionally valid exercise of the state's regulatory power. In effect, the 
Court seems to be saying that reliance on existing legal standards 
is not reasonably justified when those standards exist in an area 
subject to legislative regulation. 
There is a line of case authority, then, that appears to give sole 
consideration to the regulatory power of government to the exclusion 
of any concern for the vested rights of individuals abrogated by 
149. See, e.g., Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66 (1964), as 
amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 662, 664, 666 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
150. ll58 U.S. at 91. 
151. See text accompanying note 148 supra. 
152. ll58 U.S. at 91. 
15!!. See text accompanying note 117 supra. 
154. !128 U.S. 80 (1946). 
155. ll28 U.S. at 8!!. 
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exercise of that regulatory power.1116 Under this type of analysis, retro-
active application of the NEPA would seem clearly to be constitu-
tional since Congress obviously has the authority to regulate the 
agencies it has created. The uncertainty of the case law, however, 
makes it impossible to predict whether retroactive application of 
the NEPA can be upheld solely on the basis of the regulatory power 
of Congress.m Rather, in any individual case the Court may be dis-
posed to give greater weight to the vested individual rights involved 
and follow the dictate of Justice Holmes: "As long recognized, some 
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to 
the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have 
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone."1158 But 
even under a strict balancing test as envisioned by Justice Holmes, 
the public interest in the exercise of regulatory powers must be 
weighed against the private interests involved. Particularly in cases 
involving retroactive application of the NEPA, in which Congress 
is not abrogating contract rights for financial gain, but rather is 
exercising its regulatory powers for the preservation of the environ-
ment, the balance tips in favor of retroactive application of the Act. 
It is submitted that under a strict balancing test the loss sustained 
by a private contractor does not outweigh the great public interest 
furthered by retroactive application of the Act. The argument in 
favor of retroactivity is buttressed by the questionable status of the 
contractor's reliance interests that exists because he is dealing in a 
heavily regulated area.m Finally, the case for retroactivity is further 
strengthened by the legitimate motives of the congressional action 
and the need for a comprehensive legislative scheme to regulate 
agency activity in the vital area of environmental control.160 
The conclusion that retroactive application of the NEPA is 
constitutional is supported by still another factor recognized by the 
Court-the degree of necessity that a particular statute be given 
retroactive effect in order to accomplish the purposes for which it 
was passed. This concept assumes that a legitimate public interest 
is furthered by the statute and looks to the extent to which it must 
be applied retroactively to further that interest. As summarized by 
one commentator, "[t]he need for retroactivity is particularly com-
pelling in those cases in which the very transaction from which it 
is claimed a vested right has arisen is one of those which motivated 
156. FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958); Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 
328 U.S. 80 (1946); Louisville 8c N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). See also cases 
cited in note 136 supra. 
157. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra. 
158. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 41S (1922). 
159. See text accompanying notes 148-52 supra. 
160. See, e.g., Lichter v. United Stat.es, 334 U.S. 742 (1948). 
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the legislature to act."161 An example of this concept is supplied by 
Mottley, in which the Court held that subsequent legislation pro-
hibiting railroads from furnishing transportation for any considera-
tion other than the cash fare properly invalidated a previous agree-
ment on the part of a railroad to furnish free transportation to 
another private party.162 Since the private rights asserted were ac-
quired from precisely the type of transaction that was subsequently 
prohibited, retroactive application of the statute to invalidate that 
transaction became particularly appropriate to the accomplishment 
of the purpose of the statute.163 
Admittedly, in the case of the NEPA, this argument is one step 
removed since the statute would operate not to decimate directly 
the contract giving rise to the vested rights asserted, but rather to 
invalidate the supportive agency decision. Thus, it is not the trans-
action itself that is objected to but the underlying agency action-
i.e., the approval of a project that will produce detrimental effects 
on the environment. This indirectness, however, does not eliminate 
the argument; it merely lessens its force. Moreover, apart from this 
"specific transaction" aspect, the motivating purpose behind the 
passage of the Act would seem to impel the need for retroactivity. 
As noted earlier, Congress enacted the NEPA, at least in part, in 
recognition of existing environmental abuses fostered by agency 
activity.164 Therefore, in order to accomplish fully the purpose of 
correcting and preventing such abuse, the need for retroactive ap-
plication of the Act is especially convincing. 
Thus, given the various factors that are likely to be considered 
by the Court and the different analyses that may be employed, it 
appears that, in the great majority of cases, the Court would con-
clude that retroactive application of the NEPA is constitutional. The 
magnitude of the public interest served by retroactivity is great. 
Furthermore, to accomplish fully the purposes Congress sought 
to achieve, retroactive enforcement of the Act is particularly 
appropriate. Moreover, those private rights asserted in opposition 
to retroactivity are not of a nature generally given much deference 
by the Court. However, as a caveat it should be noted that because 
the constitutionality of retroactive legislation .is an especially amor-
phous area, when the equities of a given case strongly favor protec-
tion of individual rights, it is possible that the Court will reach 
such a result. Nevertheless, in all but the most extreme cases, it is 
submitted that under present standards, retroactive application of 
161. Hochman, supra note 34, at 701-02. 
162. 219 U.S. at 467. 
163. See generally Hochman, supra note 34, at 702. 
164. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra. 
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the NEPA is consistent with constitutional principles and will be 
upheld by the Court. 
III. CONCLUSION 
In every case in which the NEPA is sought to be applied retro-
actively, the court must first determine whether the policy of the 
Act can be achieved by retroactive application. In some cases the 
damage caused by a project will be complete and the court will be 
presented with a fait accompli. This situation will probably arise 
only in those cases in which construction has progressed substantially. 
For example, if the project in question has already destroyed a trout 
steam,165 there is little that any court can do to rectify that damage. 
At that point, modifying or invalidating the original agency decision 
to comply "to the fullest extent possible" with the standards of the 
Act will not undo the damage.166 Indeed, it may be argued that a 
project which has progressed to the point at which compliance with 
the scheme of the Act is impossible is beyond the reach of the legis-
lative intent.167 Under these circumstances, both the practical reali-
ties of the situation and the restriction of legislative intent militate 
against retroactive application. But, before the court dismisses a 
case on this basis, it should be satisfied that the policy of the Act 
cannot be effectuated. 
In those cases in which the court is not presented with a fait 
accompli, clle only possible restraint on retroactive application of 
the Act will be a successful due process argument. As noted above, 
there appears to be adequate precedent for upholding retroactive 
application of the NEPA. In most cases, the extent of private loss 
caused by retroactive application of the Act will be mitigated by 
some form of monetary award.168 If the loss is mitigated or nullified, 
the strongest argument against retroactive application of the NEPA 
is substantially reduced. 
Retroactive application of the NEPA may reopen many federal 
agency projects and decisions to scrunity under the new standards 
set out in the Act. Suits brought under the NEPA may force some 
165. This may have been the case in Bartlett but the issue was never discussed by 
the court. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text. 
166. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1965-1965). See text accompanying note 80 supra. 
167. See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra. 
168. Many government contracts contain "termination for convenience" clauses, 
which allow the government agency to terminate the contract for good reason (i.e., 
when it is deemed in the public interest), even though the private party has not de-
faulted. Most termination-for-convenience clauses entitle the private contractor to re-
cover cost plus profits on work already performed. See generally Gantt, Paul &: Cohen, 
Terminations in Federal Government Contracts, 7 WM. &: MARY L. REv. 225 (1966). In 
similar situations, in which there is no termination-for-convenience clause, the pri-
vate contractor is generally entitled to normal contract damages. See, e.g., G.L. Chris-
tian 8: Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. CI. 1963). 
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of the more notorious projects169 to be altered or abandoned. In 
each case the court must decide on the facts whether the strong 
congressional policy expressed in the Act can be effectuated without 
violating the due process clause. It is submitted that in most cases 
this policy can and should be effectuated by the courts. Congress 
has attempted to respond to the existing environmental crisis with 
broad corrective legislation. The courts should not retreat from the 
opportunity to rectify current ecological abuses by retroactive ap-
plication of the standards of the NEPA. 
169. See note 30 supra. 
